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Child Pornography, The First Amendment,
And The Media: The Constitutionality
of Super-Obscenity Laws
By JAMES W. MOORE*
I
Introduction
The Supreme Court will soon address the constitutionality of
New York's child pornography law.1 The issue is significant. If
the law is upheld, the Court may create a new exception to the
First Amendment's guarantee of free expression. If it is invali-
dated, as many as twenty-eight state legislatures2 may face the
task of redrafting similar statutes.
The child pornography issue is relatively new; in 1977, Time
magazine observed:
Child porn is hardly new, but according to police in Los Ange-
les, New York and Chicago, sales began to surge a year ago and
are still climbing. Years ago much child pornography was
fake-young looking women dressed as Lolitas. Now the use of
real children is startlingly common. Cook County State's At-
torney Bernard Carey says porno pictures of children as young
as five or six are now generally available in Chicago.
3
Child pornography had suddenly become too widespread,
too intrusive and too realistic to be tolerated. Real children
were being sexually exploited for profit. They were often re-
markably young and often, it seemed, they were American
children.4
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15 (McKinney, 1980).
2. See note 15 and accompanying text, infra.
3. Child's Garden of Perversity, TImE, Apr. 4, 1977, at 55.
4. "[B]ased upon my personal experience in law enforcement, I believe the only
type of material that I had ever seen in the past always seemed to be... of foreign
origin, but in the last 18 months I was talking about there is a proliferation of what
appears to be a more domestic type of material." Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977) (statement of Mr.
Bernard Carey).
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As a social problem, child pornography appears to have first
arisen in the mid-1970's. The journalist Robin Lloyd discovered
it in 1976 while doing research for a book on child prostitution.'
A professor teaching a class on child abuse in Illinois was
shocked when students began bringing examples of child por-
nography to class.6 The Illinois legislature uncovered the prob-
lem while redrafting its obscenity law, a discovery which
prompted the Chicago Tribune to make its own investigation.7
In May, 1977, the Tribune published a series of exhaustive and
sensational articles, describing the problem as it existed in
Chicago, Los Angeles and New Orleans.' In the same month,
an equally sensational report was televised on CBS's "60 Min-
utes" show.9
The new child pornography was graphic and perverse. It
shocked reporters, and it shocked their readers; it was not diffi-
cult to conclude that the children depicted had suffered from
the experience." In January, 1977, Dr. Judianne Densen-
Gerber, a child psychologist specializing in drug problems,
launched a crusade for new and stringent legislation."
Congress and almost all of the states have now enacted child
pornography statutes. 2 All of these statutes forbid the produc-
tion of any visual media depicting specified sexual conduct by
children. The federal Protection of Children Against Sexual
5. R. LLOYD, FOR MONEY OR LOVE, BOY PROSTTUTrION IN AMERICA (1976).
6. Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings, House Judiciary Comm. I (statement of Professor Frank Osanka).
7. Id. at 109 (statement of Michael Sneed, George Bliss, and Ray Moseley, report-
ers, Chicago Tribune).
8. Sneed, Bliss & Moseley, Child Pornography: Sickness for Sale, Chicago Trib-
une, May 15, 1977, at 1, col. 1, May 16, 1977, at 1, col. 1, May 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (first of
four part series of articles), reprinted in Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note
6, at 428-42.
9. "60 Minutes," CBS telecast, May 15, 1977, vol. IX, no. 33; "Kiddie Porn," re-
printed in Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).
10. See material reprinted in Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note 9, at
389-458; Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 121-50; Sexual Exploitation of Children:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 341-50, 427-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings,
House Ed. & Labor Comm. ].
11. See Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note 6, at 39-40 (statement of
Judianne Densen-Gerber).
12. See notes 13 and 15 and accompanying text, infra.
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Exploitation Act of 197713 prohibits the sale, distribution and
display only of media that are obscene. 4 State legislatures
have not always been so circumspect. Forty-seven states have
adopted child pornography statutes. Of these, all but Mis-
souri's restrict promotion as well as production of visual me-
dia. Twenty-eight of these state laws do not include an
obscenity standard."i One such statute, New York Penal Law
13. Act of Feb. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stats. 7-9 (codified in 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2251-2253).
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) (1976) provides:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
any visual or print medium depicting such conduct, shall be punished as pro-
vided under subsection (c), if such person knows or has reason to know that
such visual or print medium will be transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce or mailed, or if such visual or print medium has actually been trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
18 U.S.C. § 2252, which applies to transportation, distribution and sale, does include an
obscenity standard. 18 U.S.C. 2253(2) reads:
'[S]exually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated-(A) sexual inter-
course, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation; (D) sado-masochistic abuse (for the purpose of sexual
stimulation); or (E) lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person.
15. These statutes either track the standard in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973), or specify "obscene" material: ALA. CODE §§ 13-7-230-238 (Supp. 1981); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4201-4205 (Supp. 1980); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.1(b) (West 1981); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196a (West Supp. 1980) (specifies: "promotion of a performance
or material which is obscene as to minors, notwithstanding such performance or mate-
rial is intended for an adult audience"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 11-20a (Smith-
Hurd 1979); IND. CODE AN. §§ 35-30-10.1-.2 (West Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27
§ 419A (Supp. 1981); MuNx. STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-1463, 28-807 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. Ann. § 650.2 (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
190.6 (Supp. 1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.321 (Page Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 163.483-.485 (1979); S.C. CODE § 16-15-380 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1020
(Supp. 1981); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1980-81); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-374.1 (Supp. 1981) (specifies: "obscene for children"). Missouri prohibits only
the production of child pornography, and leaves distribution and sale to the ordinary
obscenity laws. (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.060 (Vernon 1979)). These laws do not include
any obscenity test: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.455 (1978); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3552-
3555 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11,
§§ 1108-10 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.014 (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9943a
(Supp. 1980); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 707-750-51 (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 728.1-.12
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3516 (Supp. 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 531.300-.370
(Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.81.1 (West Supp. 1980); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §§ 2921-22 (Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 272, § 29A (West Supp. 1980);
MiCH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 750.145a (Supp. 1980-81); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-5-31-37
(Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.509 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1 (1980); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§§ 263.00-263.25 (McKinney 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-21-07-09 (19-); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1021.2-.3 (West Supp. 1980-81); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6312 (Pur-
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section 263.15,16 has been declared unconstitutional by the New
York Court of Appeals; the United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari.17 This note considers the background, his-
tory, and possible fate of this New York statute.
New York's experience is interesting in part because it illus-
trates a possible conflict between the new child pornography
legislation and what may be called the "legitimate media."18
Child pornography legislation affects not only producers of ac-
tual pornography, but also established publishing houses and
film companies that operate openly and have an interest in us-
ing child actors, or at least in the continued display of pictures
and films made in the past with the use of child actors. Reputa-
ble photographers have made serious, artistic nude photo-
graphs including children.19 Sex education material may be
more helpful to children if it depicts child actors.
20
Sexuality exists in minors as well as in adults. Sociologists
believe that most Americans discover sex during adolescence
and that for this reason adolescence is a particularly difficult
and important period in life.21 It is arguable that this experi-
ence is significant enough to be an appropriate theme for me-
dia depiction, and that the media have shown a capacity to
treat this theme in a non-abusive, responsible, and even
thought-provoking way.22 The legitimate media have used ju-
venile actors to depict simulated sexual activity, and some seri-
ous filmmakers see child pornography legislation as a threat to
their artistic freedom.23
Legitimate depiction of sexual themes has been protected by
don Supp. 1980-81); ILL GEN. LAwS §§ 11-9-1, 11-9-7.1-.3 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-22-25 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206.5 (Supp. 1979); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-8C-1-3 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.203 (West Supp. 1980-81).
16. (McKinney 1980).
17. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674 (unpublished case, hereinafter cited from slip
opinion), cert. granted, - U.S. - (Nov. 16, 1981).
18. See text accompanying notes 91-108 and 118-127, irnfra.
19. See 123 CONG. REC. 33,054 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Culver). Culver refers to a
portfolio of photographs by Edward Weston advertised in the Washingtonian for Octo-
ber, 1977.
20. See text accompanying notes 92-93, infra.
21. See, e.g., C. CHnuMAN, ADOLESCENT SEXUAIATY IN A CHANGING AMERICA (1978);
A. HASS, TEENAGE SExUALIrY: A SURVEY OF TEENAGE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1979); R.
SORENSON, ADOLESCENT SEXUALrrY IN CoNTEMPORARY AMERICA (1973).
22. See ifims cited in note 23, infra.
23. The actor Richard Dreyfuss considered the problem a serious one:
Well, one of the things that came [sic I to mind is that, really, in terms of let's
say the ifims that I personally have done, "American Graffiti" could fall under
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the obscenity standard in Miller v. California,24 which requires
that a work be considered as a whole and protects material
that is not patently offensive, does not appeal to a prurient in-
terest, or has serious literary, artistic, scientific or political
value. But even under Miller, legitimate media are inhibited in
ways that pornographers are not. Legitimate media must
maintain an image of respectability and have relatively high
expenses in proportion to profit; they can ill afford to litigate
obscenity cases.
2
Legitimate media are particularly vulnerable to uncertainty.
Unlike most pornographers, these media distribute to a na-
tional market, but they may be prosecuted in almost any juris-
diction under an unpredictable, local "community standard.
'26
The enactment of state child pornography laws, many of which
recognize no constitutional standard, magnifies this uncer-
tainty. Because they are open to scrutiny, legitimate media
have little choice but to comply with the federal act of 1977.
Whether compliance will save them from legal difficulty is an-
other question. State child pornography laws are usually more
restrictive than the federal statute and- are frequently vague
[a child pornography statute without an obscenity standard] more, even [sic]
specifically, than "Inserts.".
If there are existing laws, such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor
* . .that could deal with these problems in any way, then they should be more
vigorously enforced. But when you have a bill that deals with the punishment
of those people who are involved in the interstate selling and receiving end,
then those people ... actors, airplane pilots, studio chiefs, directors of other
kinds of films could be nailed or at least pressured into not creating their work
Not only is "The Exorcist" or "Lolita" or whatever an example of a film that
might be harmed, so is "American Graffiti," so is "Taxi Driver," so is "Loose
Change" by Francois Truffaut ....
Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 191.
24. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
25. There is evidence that for these reasons, obscenity law under Miller has been
more effective in chilling the efforts of nationally distributed fim companies than in
deterring pornographers. See material cited in Community Standards, Class Actions,
and Obscenity under Miller v. California, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1838, 1860-61 n.94 (1975).
26. Since the abolition of the "national standard" in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at
30-31, juries have enjoyed a very broad discretion in deciding obscenity cases, see Jen-
kins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Note, supra note 25, at 1839-46. Critics have com-
plained that the "community standard," coupled with opportunities for prosecutorial
forum shopping under federal postal laws, tends to make the standards of the most
conservative jurisdiction into a de facto national standard. See id. at 1858-60; Note,
Federal Obscenity Prosecutions: Dirty Dealing With the First Amendment? 18 SANrA
CLARA L. REV. 720, 736-756.
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and mutually inconsistent.27 Prosecution under one of these
statutes could be disastrous for the media; child pornography
statutes carry exceedingly heavy penalties. 28 Nationally dis-
tributed media thus face a frighteningly unpredictable array of
dangerous local traps. Statutes like New York Penal Law sec-
tion 263.15 threaten more than an abstract conception of First
Amendment freedom; they endanger a concrete and legitimate
media interest.
II
Background of the New York Statute: The
State's Interest and the Problem of
Constitutionality
A. Defining the State's Interest
If the Miller standard cannot be maintained without causing
children to suffer, then most would probably agree that the
state's interest in protecting children ought to prevail. The
question is to what extent these interests are incompatible, a
27. Massachusetts prohibits dissemination of "visual material that contains a re-
production of any posture or exhibition in a state of nudity or any act that depicts,
describes, or represents sexual conduct participated or engaged in by a child under
eighteen years of age." (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29A (West Supp. 1981)). Lou-
isiana prohibits "the sale, distribution, or possession with intent to sell or distribute,
any photographs, films, videotapes, or other reproductions of any act of sexual conduct
or the obscene, lewd, or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area involving a
child under the age of seventeen." The Louisiana statute annexes a penalty of from
two to ten years imprisonment, "without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence." (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.81.1 (West Supp. 1981)). Neither statute includes
a definition of "sexual conduct," a concept which might be extended to include kissing
or even flirtation-if the prosecutor disapproves of a film. This is not an exhaustive list
of problematic statutes. Sixteen of these are reviewed in Note, Child Pornography
Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 520-31 (1978-79). The author concludes: "Few generaliza-
tions can be stated about these statutes. As a rule, they are broader than the federal
legislation. They tend to focus on depictions of certain acts rather than view the works
as a whole .... However, no two statutes on child pornography are identical ... "
Id. at 531.
28. Penalties vary widely, but are generally severe by the standards of the jurisdic-
tion. California makes the crime of using a child in a sexual performance punishable
by three, four, or five years imprisonment; the offense is deemed to be as serious as
assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311.4, 245
(West, 1982). By national standards, the California law is mild. More typical is the
federal statute, which annexes a penalty of not more than ten years imprisonment,
both for the production and for the distribution of child pornography. (18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251(c), 2252(b) (1976)). In Delaware, repeat offenders face a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment. (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1110 (1979)).
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question that was raised repeatedly in congressional hearings
held pursuant to enactment of the federal act of 1977.
Congress assumed that production of explicit sexual media
depicting children is child abuse in itself and is not protected
by the First Amendment. Producers must necessarily induce
children to engage in sex, a practice which was in many cases
already illegal.29 Although they were unable to cite supporting
case law, expert witnesses agreed that courts would probably
uphold a statute banning production of such media under a
"sexually explicit conduct" standard-regardless of whether
the material produced was obscene.30 But these witnesses also
believed that the sale, distribution, and display of sexually ex-
plicit media constitute speech and are probably protected by
the First Amendment unless the media are obscene.31 Debate
centered around the question, whether there existed a state in-
terest strong enough to justify prohibition of what had been
considered constitutionally protected speech.
Congressmen who favored strong sanctions against the sale,
distribution, and display of sexually explicit media did not usu-
ally say that these media should be suppressed because they
were obscene. More often, they argued that these sanctions
are necessary to prevent direct abuse of children in pornogra-
phy.32 They observed that child pornography is lucrative and
that profit is an incentive to child abuse. Producers of child
pornography work clandestinely and are hard to catch; it is
simpler to cut off their market by penalizing distribution.33
But Congress also heard, and probably considered, testi-
mony suggesting that the state had a substantial interest in
suppressing obscenity.3 4 Representative Dornan (R-Calif.) ar-
29. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 272 (contributing to the delinquency of a minor),
288 (exciting lust of child under age of fourteen (West, 1981)).
30. See Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 83-84 (statement of Peter Flaherty, Dep-
uty Atty. Gen.); id. at 92 (statement of Paul Bender, professor of law); Hearings, House
Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 314 (statement of John Keeney, Deputy Asst.
Att'y General).
31. See id. at 299-301 (statement of John Keeney); Senate Hearings, supra note 9,
at 91 (statement of Peter Flaherty); id. at 104-06 (statement of Paul Bender).
32. Sen. Roth, Rep. Kildee, and Rep. Murphy, all authored bills which included
strong penalties for promotion of sexually explicit material including children, and all
argued that this was their primary purpose. See 123 CONG. REC. 33,050 (1977) (remarks
of Sen. Roth); Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 2 (statement of
Rep. Kildee); id. at 329-30 (statement of Rep. Murphy). See also id. at 76 (statement of
Joe Freitas); id. at 118-19 (statement of Robin Lloyd).
33. See material cited in note 32, supra.
34. See notes 35-41, intfra.
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gued that child pornography was only an aggravated form of
obscenity, an inevitable consequence of sexual permissiveness
and resultant moral decay. It could be eliminated, he said,
only by a vigorous campaign against all obscenity. 5 Dornan
was seconded by the Mayor of New York3 -- then engaged in
"cleaning up" midtown Manhattan-and by the then present-
then acting-Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department. 7
Possibly more persuasive was testimony by members of the
Los Angeles Police Department that most apprehended
pedophiles-child molesters or "chicken hawks"-had child
pornography in their possession 38 and that this material was
used to seduce children.39
Dr. Densen-Gerber testified that child pornography is partic-
ularly dangerous because it "encourages, rationalizes and jus-
tifies sexual activity with children."' ° She said that it had
caused the rate of incest to rise and that it promoted the "disin-
tegration of family values."41 Although she presented no evi-
dence to support her more sweeping assertions, it does seem
probable that graphic and widely available child pornography
might make sex with children seem acceptable.
The state has a constitutionally recognized interest in "stem-
ming the tide of commercialized obscenity," both to preserve
the "quality of life" and because "there is at least an arguable
correlation between obscenity and crime." 4 The correlation of
child pornography to crime is more obvious than that of con-
ventional pornography; while much obscene material depicts
activities that are in themselves entirely innocent, child por-
nography depicts-and may encourage--criminal misconduct.
The state's interest in suppressing child pornography as ob-
scenity might arguably be as great as its interest in protecting
children from direct abuse in pornography, which, testimony
indicates,43 makes up only a small part of a nationwide pattern
35. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 14-i5, 20.
36. See id. at 257, 260 (statement of Abraham Beame).
37. See id. at 27-30 (statement of Daryl F. Gates, Acting Chief, L.A.P.D.).
38. See id. at 36, 38 (statement of Barbara Pruitt, LA.P.D.); id. at 40 (statement of
Lloyd Martin, L.A.P.D.).
39. See id. at 39, 44.
40. Id. at 264.
41. Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note 6, at 43.
42. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
43. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 41 (statement of
Lloyd Martin, L.A.P.D.); id. at 80 (statement of Robert Leonard, Prosecuting Att'y,
Flint, Mi.); id. at 95 (statement of Joe Freitas, Dist. Att'y of San Francisco); id. at 109
[Vol. 4
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of sexual child abuse.
However, few members of Congress stressed the state's in-
terest in suppressing obscenity. Representative Murphy
(R-Penn.), sponsor of the first federal child pornography bill,
said with some vehemence that his bill had nothing whatever
to do with obscenity." Murphy did not mean to disparage the
state's interest in suppressing obscenity; he meant that he was
dissatisfied with past enforcement of obscenity laws and did
not wish to be restricted by the Miller standard.' The primary
theoretical objection to an obscenity standard was that "[t] he
focus of the bill is on the sexual and emotional abuse of the
child per se rather than on whether such an abuse [sic] might
be obscene."'  The greatest practical objection was that the
Miller standard made it too difficult for prosecutors to
convict.
47
However, prosecutors themselves did not raise this objec-
tion. Several prosecutors testified that child pornography was,
or would be, so shocking to juries as to make conviction simple,
even under the Miller standard.'. Two prosecutors went so far
to object that legislation which omitted an obscenity standard
would be subject to constitutional challenge on appeal and em-
broil them in unwanted litigation.49
Two congressional committees found that, as a practical mat-
ter, media depicting sexual abuse of children were almost al-
ways obscene.50  The House Committee on the Judiciary
emphasized that the issue of obscenity is decided by juries."'
(remark of Rep. Miller); id. at 128 (statement of Henry Giaretto, Dir., Child Sexual
Abuse Treatment Program); letter of Rep. Jeffords to Rep. Kildee (May 11, 1977) re-
printed in Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note 6, at 348.
44. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 327.
45. See id.
46. Id.; see also 123 CONG. REC. 33,050 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Roth).
47. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 327 (statement of
Rep. Murphy); 123 CONG. REC. 33,054 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
48. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 325 (statement of
John Keeney, Deputy Asst. Att'y Gen.); id. at 358 (statement of C' Niel Benson, Chief
Postal Inspector); id at 421 (statement of G.R. Dickerson, Acting Commissioner of
Customs); Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note 6, at 260 (statement of Larry
Parrish, former U.S. Att'y); id. at 280 (statement of Richard Wier, Att'y Gen. of
Delaware).
49. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 83, 85, 93 (statement
of Robert F. Leonard, Children in Pornography, Public Hearing, State of California
Senate Select Committee on Children and Youth, 25-27 (1977)) (statement of Joseph
Freitas).
50. See notes 55 and 58 and accompanying text, infra.
51. H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977). The Committee found:
No. 1]
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Apparently the Committee believed that juries would not ac-
quit people who profit from the abuse of children.5 2 This con-
clusion seems reasonable. The Miller system gives juries
exceedingly wide discretion in deciding what is obscene.13 One
experienced prosecutor has blamed the difficulty of getting ob-
scenity convictions on a growing jury tolerance for pornogra-
phy. 4 But this difficulty seems unlikely to arise in child
pornography prosecutions; even if it is true that Americans do
not mind pornography, it is not often said that they like child
abusers. It has been argued that juries are likely to under-
stand the need to protect children too well and that juries in
child pornography cases may become so emotional as to reach
verdicts unfair to the media--even under existing obscenity
standards. 6
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary had heard testimony
that although some non-obscene films, such as "The Exorcist,"
did include brief scenes depicting simulated sexual activity by
minors, the filming of these scenes probably did not constitute
child abuse serious enough to be of legislative concern.5 7 The
We have viewed much of this material, and there seems little doubt that they
[sicI would be found obscene under existing federal and state obscenity laws.
The Supreme Court ruling in Miller v. California, supra, considerably relaxed
the requirements for proving obscenity by--
a. Declaring that the standard of obscenity should be a local, and not a na-
tional one. (Subsequent decisions by the Court suggest that the effect of this
change is that if a jury finds that material is obscene, then a "local standards"
[sic] has been established.
b. [Abolishing the requirement that obscene material be utterly without re-
deeming social importance].
52. Cf. Hearings, House Judiciary Comm., supra note 6, at 221 (statement of Rep.
Conyers, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime), Rep. Conyers stated that, "The Subcommit-
tee staff has received hundreds of letters from the public expressing disgust at the
revelations .... Surely, in this country, a survey of the "community standard" for
freedom of expression would not allow for child pornography."
53. See note 26, supra.
54. Pines, The Obscenity Quagmire, 49 CAL ST. B.J. 509, 561-62 (1974) (at the time,
Burt Pines was City Att'y for Los Angeles).
55. Cf. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 273-75 (1966). The authors
compare the rate of jury conviction for indecent exposure in cases involving minors
and in those involving adult victims, concluding that juries normally regard the offense
as "de minimis"-except when children are involved.
56. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL.
L.F. 711, 745 (1978).
57. Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 108. Professor Bender testified:
"The Exorcist" is not obscene and therefore if you are worried about
whatever the child did in "The Exorcist," then you could not reach that
through prohibiting "The Exorcist." I'm not sure you should be worried about
a child acting in a film that is protected by the first amendment under present
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Committee did not fully adopt this standpoint, but observed
that in any event, "all of the bills considered by the Committee
would ban the use of children in the actual production of such
scenes in the future," 8 and concluded that "virtually all of the
materials that are normally considered child pornography are
obscene under the current standards. 5 9
It thus appears that child pornography legislation protects
two interests, both derivative from the state's underlying inter-
est in protecting children. It protects children directly from
physical abuse in pornography and indirectly by suppressing
obscene material that might encourage further abuse or might
be used to seduce children. There are cogent reasons to be-
lieve that both these interests can be adequately protected
under existing obscenity standards.
B. The Constitutional Issue
Before enacting the federal act of 1977, Congress considered
several theories under which the Act might have been held
constitutional, if it had not included an obscenity standard. It
seems unnecessary here to analyze all these theories in depth.
Some of them have already been adequately criticized.60
Moreover, the outcome of the child pornography issue does not
necessarily depend on the merit of one or another theoretical
construct. Courts have wide latitude to uphold a statute, even
in the First Amendment area, if they regard the interest under-
lying the statute as sufficiently compelling.6 1 However, some of
obscenity standards. It is hard for me to conceive of a child acting in a film like
"The Exorcist" as being child abuse of the sort that I think you are mostly
worried about. After all, that takes place in a more or less open situation with
a well-established business. There are parents or guardians around who are
looking after their child's best interest. This is not some child that they are
abusing in the ordinary sense of that word. It's a child that they are using as
an actor. Although the child may be doing things that you or I would not want
our children to do, I do not think there is a major social problem when you are
dealing with material protected by the first amendment. I think the major so-
cial problem here is children being abused in ways that show up in material
that is not protected by the first amendment under present constitutional
doctrine.
58. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1977).
59. Id. at 13.
60. See Note, supra note 56, at 741-44 nn.151-57.
61. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 622 (1973). The Supreme Court
held that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe
that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. Although "substantial
overbreadth" is not a precise concept, see J. NowAcic, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HAND-
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these theories have wider implications which are worth men-
tioning because of their potential to cause mischief if the theo-
ries are adopted.
John Keeney, a lawyer testifying for the Department of Jus-
tice,62 suggested that legislation that did not include an obscen-
ity standard might be justified by the Supreme Court's holding
in United States v. O'Brien,63 which reads in part:
[A] government regulation [affecting speech] is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest."
But it is unclear in what way O'Brien can be said to justify
statutes like New York Penal Law section 263.15. It appears
doubtful that a statute whose direct effect is to prohibit what
has been regarded as protected speech can be said to further a
"governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression" within the meaning of O'Brien.6' In O'Brien, the
Court held that the burning of a draft card is not constitution-
ally protected as "symbolic speech."6 The government for-
bade the destruction of draft cards to preserve the selective
service system; this interest was held to be unrelated to the
BOOK ON CONSTrrutIONAL LAw 725 (1978), the case seems to stand for the principle that
the Supreme Court is reluctant to strike down statutes for overbreadth. See id. One
author has described a test like that in Broadrick as a balancing test and suggests that
it could be used to uphold a statute such as N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15, see Note, Protec-
tion of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable
Legislation, 12 U. Micu. J.L REF. 295, 314, 317-18, 317 n.133 (1979). One lower court has
in fact used Broadrick in this way, see text accompanying notes 112-13, infra.
62. Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 300.
63. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
64. Id. at 377.
65. See id. at 385; the Court distinguishes two earlier cases, saying:
In these cases, the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevi-
table effect... [of the statutes struck down in those cases] abridged constitu-
tional rights. The statute attacked in the instant case has no such inevitable
unconstitutional effect, since the destruction of Selective Service certificates is
in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive."
The display of visual media would seem to be inevitably expressive.
66. See id. at 376. The Court said-
O'Brien first argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to
him because his act of burning his registration certificate was protected "sym-
bolic speech" within the First Amendment. His argument is that the freedom
of expression which the First Amendment guarantees includes all modes of
"communication of ideas by conduct," and that his conduct is within this deft-
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suppression of free expression67 and "sufficiently important" to
"justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms."6 Statutes like New York Penal Law section 263.15 do
not incidentally limit expression; they suppress it directly.
The display of films and other visual media is not "symbolic
speech"; it does not combine "'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele-
ments" "in the same course of conduct. '69 The display of films
has been held to be speech per se,70 a holding which should
probably not be disturbed without careful consideration of its
wider First Amendment implications.
A second theory would make the dealer in child pornography
an accessory after the fact to child abuse. 71 This theory also
has questionable implications. Child pornography statutes
that govern speech prohibit the display of visual media depict-
ing specific types of conduct, regardless of when, or in what
jurisdiction, the media were produced. Statutes like New York
Penal Law section 263.15, which do not include an obscenity
standard, seem especially likely to sweep into their ambit me-
dia depicting conduct that was quite lawful at the time and
place of production. 72 A court depending on this theory might
thus find itself in the anomalous position of trying a defendant
as an accessory to a non-existent crime.
A third theory was advanced by Senator Helms (R-N.C.) on
the Senate floor73 and is incorporated in the preface of Colo-
rado's child pornography statute.74 Under this theory, distribu-
tion of media depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit
activity can be made a crime because it is an invasion of the
minor's privacy, an invasion to which the minor is by definition
incapable of consent. It is an offense in itself, independent of
any abuse which may have occurred in producing the media.
nition because he did it in "demonstration against the war and against the
draft."
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.
67. See id. at 378-82.
68. Id. at 376.
69. Id.
70. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Kingsley Pictures Corp. v.
Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
71. See Hearings, House Ed & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Kildee); at 74 (statement of Joseph Freitas); at 221 (statement of Rep. Koch).
72. See text accompanying note 108-115, infra.
73. 123 CONG. REC. 33,056 (1977).
74. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (Supp. 1981).
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Ostensibly, Helms's proposal is based on a recognized cate-
gory of unprotected speech and would thus seem to escape
constitutional objections that might be raised against the other
two. However, there is some novelty in the idea that the state
has a direct interest in preventing the invasion of privacy. Tra-
ditionally, invasion of privacy has been thought to be a tort
doctrine. The press may find it alarming to see a precedent es-
tablished that would make invasion of privacy a crime.
The theories described above are problematic. At best, they
rest on awkward legal fictions; at worst, they imply a curtail-
ment of First Amendment freedoms going beyond the area of
child pornography itself. These theories share the failing that
they rest solely on the state's interest in protecting its own
children. This interest would not seem to justify the suppres-
sion of media produced in another nation or culture where the
activities depicted are not illegal. If, as is suggested above,75
child pornography legislation also protects an interest in sup-
pressing obscenity, then this rationale seems inadequate be-
cause it does not justify suppressing obscene material pro-
duced abroad. But if child pornography legislation reaches
non-obscene media produced abroad, or before the legislation
was enacted, then it overreaches its purpose, for the state has
no apparent interest in protecting children beyond the scope of
its police power. New York's experience suggests that this log-
ical difficulty may create practical and constitutional
problems.76
III
Genesis of New York's Child Pornography Law
The crusade against child pornography had its base in New
York,77 and New York was among the first states to adopt a
child pornography statute. In February, 1977, Assemblyman
Howard Lasher and State Senator Ralph Marino introduced in
the New York legislature a bill making it a felony to use a child
in any sexual performance, or to promote use of a child in such
a performance. 78 "Promotion" was defined to include distribu-
75. See text accompanying notes 35-43, supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 108-21, infra.
77. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at 12, col. 6.
78. S. 2743-A, A. 3587-A, Cal. No. 754, State of N.Y. Senate-Assembly, 1977-78 Regu-
lar Sess. (hereinafter cited as S. 2743-A).
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tion, sale, or display. 9 The bill did not include an obscenity
standard. In May, the bill passed the State Assembly; it had
meanwhile been altered, Lasher told a New York Times re-
porter, to satisfy the criticisms of civil rights advocates.
80
Both the content and the rhetoric of the bill had been signifi-
cantly changed. One section of the original bill had defined
"promoting a sexual performance by a child" as a felony. As
enacted, the amended bill includes two sections governing pro-
motion. Section 263.15 prohibits "promoting a sexual perform-
ance by a child," and section 263.10 prohibits "promoting an
obscene sexual performance by a child." Aside from the word
"obscene," the two sections are identical. Both offenses are de-
fined as "class D" felonies.8 '
The rhetoric of the Lasher-Marino bill had also been
79. Id. § 263.00(4). The language is identical to that of the statute as enacted, see
note 81, infra.
80. See Fowler, Stiff Penalty for the Use of Children in Pornography Gains in Al-
bany, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1977, § D, at 12, col. 1.
81. The text is essentially identical with that of the statute as enacted, which reads
in relevant part:
§ 263.00 Definitions
As used in this article the following definitions shall apply:
1. "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof which in-
cludes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.
2. "Obscene sexual performance" means any performance which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age in any material which
is obscene....
3. "Sexual Conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals....
5. "Promote" means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend,
mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate,
present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same....
§ 263.10 Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child
A person is guilty of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child
when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or pro-
motes any obscene performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less
than sixteen years of age.
Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony.
§ 263.15 Promoting a sexual performance by a child
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, know-
ing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any
performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years
of age.
Promoting a sexual performance by a child is a class D felony.
(McKinney 1980). A class D felony carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment not to
exceed seven years, and a minimum term of one year or less. Criminal possession of
stolen property in the first degree is a class D felony. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 70.00,
165.50 (McKinney 1980).
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changed. The original draft had included a "Legislative Decla-
ration," reciting the state's interest in protecting children and
the need to prevent their abuse through commercial exploita-
tion.82  The revised bill included an additional paragraph,
which reads, as enacted:
The legislature further finds that the sale of these movies,
magazines and photographs depicting the sexual conduct of
children to be so abhorrent to the fabric of our society that it
urges those involved law enforcement officers to aggressively
seek out and prosecute both the peddlers of children and the
promoters of this filth by vigorously applying the sanctions
contained in this act.8 3
These changes are informative. The legislature, in drafting
section 263.15 without an obscenity standard, may only have
intended to make it easier for prosecutors to get convictions
and not specifically to suppress protected speech. However,
the legislature must have been aware that section 263.15 was
constitutionally doubtful, and that it would affect protected
speech. Section 263.10 was apparently meant to be a "fallback"
provision in case section 263.15 was declared uncon-
stitutional. 4
The "Legislative Declaration" is unusual; New York statutes
are not normally accompanied by declarations. 5 Since the
declaration purports to state findings of the legislature, and
since it is addressed to enforcement officers, it seems reason-
able to infer that it was written to clarify the legislature's in-
tent and serve as a guide to enforcement. Apparently the
legislature intended not only to protect children from abuse in
pornography, but also to protect "the fabric of our society"
against "movies, magazines and photographs."
Movies, magazines and photographs are forms of expres-
sion,86 and protecting the fabric of our society against these
82. S. 2743-A, supra note 78. Identical language was enacted in N.Y. PENAL LAW,
ch. 910 § 1 (McKinney 1980).
83. S. 2743-B, A. 3587-B, Cal. No. 754, State of N.Y. Senate-Assembly, 1977-78 Regu-
lar Sess. [hereinafter cited as S. 2743-B]. Identical language was enacted in N.Y. PE-
NAL LAw, ch. 910 § 1 (McKinney 1980).
84. See Memorandum from the N.Y.C.L.U. to New York Senate Codes Committee
(undated), reprinted in Joint Appendix, St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1979).
85. See N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 263 (McKinney 1980) (practice commentary by Ar-
nold D. Hechtman).
86. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Kingsley Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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media has been held to be the function of an obscenity stat-
ute. 7 To paraphrase Circuit Judge Timbers, the legislature
seems to have regarded the suppression of sexually explicit
speech as an important function of section 263.15.88 The statute
may fairly be called a "super-obscenity law," for it is directed
against speech, it carries an enhanced penalty,89 and it denies
defendants the protection of the Miller standard.
The New York Times applauded the purpose of the bill but
complained that,
[I] ts overly broad language would tend to discourage the publi-
cation and distribution of reputable works....
For example, a well-known sex education book, "Show Me,"
contains photographs of a little girl and a little boy exploring
each others' bodies, and so might fall under the new ban even
though it has been found free of obscenity in several court
tests.
90
SHOW ME!9 did seem a likely victim under section 263.15.
Its publisher, St. Martin's Press, was respectable. 2 Its author
was a Swiss psychoanalyst specializing in child-rearing. It pur-
ported to be educational; it was designed to help parents teach
children about sex.93 But the book did contain some very ex-
plicit sexual material, including pictures of children mastur-
bating. It was controversial. It had in fact withstood several
87. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
88. See St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1979) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting):
In view of the double-barrelled attack by this statute on both the production
and promotion of "this filth," I do not share my colleagues' confidence that the
New York courts would decline to apply New York law to this case because
the production took place abroad before the statute was enacted .... [I]t
was not merely direct harm to the depicted children which was the concern of
Article 263. An equally important goal appears to have been the elimination of
the derivative harm to society at large.
89. Normally, one who: "1. Promotes, or possesses with intent to promote, any ob-
scene material; or 2. Produces, presents or directs an obscene performance or partici-
pates in a portion thereof which is obscene or which contributes to its obscenity," is
guilty, in New York, only of a misdemeanor. Only wholesaler promoters of obscenity
are guilty of a felony, see N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 235.05, 235.06 (McKinney 1980).
90. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Jul. 1, 1977, § A, at 22, col. 3.
91. W. McBRIDE & H. FLEISCHAUER-HARDT, SHOW ME! A PICTURE BOOK OF SEX
FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS (1975).
92. St. Martin's Press, Inc. was a subsidiary of Macmillan Publishers, Ltd., and a
publisher of textbooks, reference works such as WHO'S WHO, and general scholarly and
trade books. SHOW ME! had been its only sexually explicit publication. See affidavit
of Thomas J. McCormack [President of St. Martin's Press, Inc.], Joint Appendix 24a-
25a, St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1979).
93. Id. at 24a-27a.
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obscenity actions.9 4 The crusader Judianne Densen-Gerber
had made the book a special target of her campaign, saying
that it taught bad morals and contributed to the breakdown of
the family.95 According to the New York Times, Assemblyman
Lasher's counsel had specifically named SHOW ME! "as in ap-
parent violation of the [new child pornography] law.
9 6
Despite this opposition, the bill quickly passed the State
Senate and became law on August 11, 1977.9
IV
Case Law Under the New York Statute
Without waiting for the new law to take effect, St. Martin's
Press stopped distribution of SHOWME! and prepared to chal-
lenge section 263.15 in federal court. It had become impractica-
ble to continue selling SHOW ME!. The statute carried a
maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment, and St. Mar-
tin's was unwilling to expose its employees to such a risk. Nor
would booksellers agree to continue selling the book. 8 St.
Martin's anticipated a very large loss in revenue.99
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1°0 the firm filed an action in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York,10 1 naming
the Governor and several district attorneys as defendants.10 2
St. Martin's asked for a preliminary injunction, which would
protect the firm from prosecution until the constitutionality of
section 263.15 could be decided in a full trial.
10 3
In granting the injunction, Judge Ward found that section
263.15 clearly applied to SHOW ME!1°4 and that St. Martin's
94. See cases cited in St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
95. See Hearings, House Ed. & Labor Comm., supra note 10, at 266.
96. See Greenhouse, Nude Child Pictures in Any Book Face Ban in Bill on Carey's
Desk, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1977, § B, at 3, col. 2.
97. See N.Y. Times, Jul. 7,1977, § B, at 6, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1977, § B, at 13,
col, 3.
98. See affidavit, supra note 92, at 32a.
99. See id. at 30a-31a, 34a-35a.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides a federal right of action to plaintiffs deprived of
their constitutional rights under color of state law.
101. St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196 (1977), rev'd, 605 F.2d 41 (2d
Cir. 1979).
102. 440 F. Supp. at 1199. Named defendants are Governor Carey and the District
Attorney of New York County. Parallel actions by booksellers against the District At-
torneys of Westchester and Suffolk Counties were consolidated for trial.
103. Id. at 1198.
104. Id. at 1201.
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Press faced a real danger of irreparable harm. 10 5 The court ob-
served that although the defendants had not threatened to
prosecute the firm, they had also repeatedly declined, at oral
argument, to say that they would not prosecute. In view of the
climate of opinion and the controversial nature of the book, the
court concluded that prosecution was likely, that the plaintiffs
had little choice but to cease distribution and that they faced a
real threat to their livelihood.10 6
The defendants had argued that state courts should be given
an opportunity to clarify the statute-to give it a constitution-
ally acceptable construction. Judge Ward held that the statute
was clear and that "when the meaning and applicability of the
statute is clear it is not necessary to give the state courts the
first chance to declare their state statutes unconstitutional.' 1 7
As applied to SHOW ME!, Judge Ward held that the statute
was constitutionally doubtful:
The argument most persuasive to the Court at this time is
that the statute as applied to SHOW ME! denies substantive
due process in making criminal the dissemination of photo-
graphs of children taken outside the United States some years
before the effective date of the statute. Where a statute affects
such fundamental rights as are at stake in this case, it "must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake". . . and to foster them by the least drastic means pos-
sible .... While New York's interest in protecting children is
both legitimate and important, the question remains whether it
has pursued rational and least drastic means for effectuating
that interest.10 8
Having appealed the decision in St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Ca-
rey,109 the District Attorney of New York County began prose-
cutions under the new law. Paul Ira Ferber, a New York
bookseller, was charged with violation of sections 263.10 and
263.15. Ferber filed a motion to dismiss in a state trial court,
claiming inter alia that section 263.15 was unconstitutional." 0
The court swiftly disposed of this claim. Citing Broaderick v.
Oklahoma,"' it held that the statute was not "substantially
105. Id. at 1203-1204.
106. Id. at 1202.
107. Id. at 1207.
108. Id. at 1205 (footnotes and citations omitted).
109. See St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1979).
110. People v. Ferber, 96 Misc. 2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1978).




This poses the not unusual dilemma of balancing the right of
freedom of expression against the right of the Legislature to
protect children against sexual exploitation....
On balance, the protection of children must prevail .... If it
were important for literary or artistic value, a juvenile over 16
who perhaps looked younger could be utilized .... Where al-
ternative means to safeguard expression are reasonably avail-
able, courts should not declare statutes unconstitutional which
may inhibit such expression but which have independent and
overriding justification." 3
The defendants in St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey had insisted
that section 263.15 must first be interpreted by a state court."4
A state court had now spoken, and that court held that the stat-
ute did and should apply to non-obscene material.
The court did not refer to a specific state interest in protect-
ing New York children, or even American children. The course
of Ferber's trial suggests that Judge Ward had been correct in
believing that section 263.15 was meant to reach material "re-
gardless of where they were photographed, the nationality of
the children, or whether the content of the book is in fact child
pornography."11 5 Ferber's attorney offered evidence purport-
ing to prove that the films in question were made in Europe.
The court ruled that the evidence was irrelevant." 6 In an ordi-
nary obscenity trial, this ruling would have been unremark-
able. But People v. Ferber was not an ordinary obscenity trial;
it was also a trial under section 263.15, which included no ob-
scenity standard. Ostensibly such statutes are meant to pro-
tect children from direct abuse in pornography.117 Since New
York had no greater apparent interest in protecting European
children depicted in the Ferber films than in protecting those
depicted in SHOW ME!, it would seem that the court inter-
preted section 263.15 as being directed against expression. It is
difficult to see what defense would have been available to St.
Martin's Press, had its case been tried in a New York court.
112. 96 Misc. 2d at 677, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637. On "substantial overbreadth," see note
61, supra.
113. 96 Misc. 2d at 676-77, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
114. See text accompanying note 107, supra.
115. 440 F. Supp. at 1206. See St. Martin's Press v. Carey, 605 F.2d at 48 n.3 (Timbers,
J., dissenting).
116. Record, 294-95, People v. Ferber, No. 233/78, Sup. Ct. N.Y. County.
117. See text accompanying notes 32 and 46 and 62-76, supra.
[Vol. 4
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
In January, 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overturned the injunction in St. Martin's Press, on the ground
that the action involved no "case or controversy."" 8 The court
suggested that the plaintiffs' fears were exaggerated" 9 and
that the plaintiffs may have been motivated by a desire for
publicity.120 It held that the lower court had erred in finding
that section 263.15 applied to SHOW ME!:
The photograph of a young man masturbating, which appel-
lees contend brings them within the reach of the statute, was
taken in Germany before 1973, and section 263.15 was not en-
acted until 1977. We cannot believe that the New York courts
would construe section 263.15 to apply to children throughout
the world, regardless of the moral and legal standards of the
country in which they live, and would disregard the fact that
the photograph in question was taken years prior to the enact-
ment of the statute and the photograph's '"promotion." We fail
to see how the New York legislature in 1977 could have had any
legitimate concern with the welfare of German children in the
years before 1973, and we believe the New York courts would
hold that the legislature had none.
121
The case thus ended inconclusively. The plaintiffs' appeal
for a rehearing was denied, but St. Martin's had gained the
breathing space it needed. By this time SHOWME! had lost its
vogue, and its publisher had no incentive to pursue the case
further.
22
The case decided nothing, but it does have illustrative value.
It illustrates the confusion inherent in treating a statute as if it
were intended solely to prevent physical abuse of children,
when both the statute's language 123 and its application 24 indi-
cate that it is directed against expression. The case also illus-
trates the severe problems that super-obscenity statutes may
cause for legitimate publishers and filmmakers. Assuming the
federal Court of Appeals was correct, 125 and that New York
courts would not have applied section 263.15 to SHOW ME!, it
is hard to see how the issue could have come to trial in a New
118. St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1979).
119. Id. at 45.
120. Id. at 45 n.3.
121. Id. at 44.
122. Telephone interview with Roy Gainsburg, of Szold, Brandwen, Myers & Altman
(counsel for St. Martin's Press) (Aug. 7, 1980).
123. See notes 82-88 and accompanying text, supra.
124. See notes 116-117 and accompanying text, supra.
125. See text accompanying note 121, supra.
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York court.'26 St. Martin's Press would have been hard put to
find employees willing to distribute the book, or legitimate
booksellers willing to sell it, considering the severe sanctions
the law imposed.127 Censorship bears more heavily on legiti-
mate expression than on pornography, and if only for this rea-
son it seems desirable that censorship laws should be narrowly
drawn.
The statute's constitutionality was thus left for state courts
to decide. Ferber's conviction was affirmed without opinion by
the Appellate Division,128 then reversed by the state's highest
tribunal, the New York Court of Appeals.
129
The Court of Appeals observed that, if possible, doubtful
statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional infirmity.
But here such a limiting construction would be meaningless,
because promotion of an obscene sexual performance by a
child was already prohibited by New York Penal Law section
263.10. Section 263.15 could therefore have no independent pur-
pose other than that of prohibiting what has traditionally been
protected speech.
130
As for the contention that section 263.15 was meant to protect
children and not to censor, the court said that where free ex-
pression is at issue First Amendment standards apply, how-
ever benign the intent of the legislature may be.' 3 ' It is true
that First Amendment standards are not absolute; the state's
interest in protecting its children may sometimes transcend
First Amendment concerns. But the court had reservations:
126. Presumably, the court did not mean to suggest that the plaintiffs should have
sued in a New York forum for declaratory or injunctive relief, which could only have
duplicated the preliminary injunction that the court dissolved and which would have
been open to objections similar to those the court raised.
127. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1908); in accepting jurisdiction to
strike down a confiscatory state law governing railroad tariffs, the Supreme Court
observed:
Disobedience to the passenger rate act renders the party guilty of a felony and
subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or imprisonment in the
state prison for a period not exceeding five years ... The company, in order
to test the validity of these acts, must find some agent or employ6 to disobey
them at the risk stated .... The officers and employ~s could not be expected
to disobey . . . at the risk of such fines and penalties being imposed upon
them, in case the court should decide that the law was valid. The result would
be a denial of any hearing to the company.
128. 74 A.D. 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1979).
129. 52 N.Y.2d 674 (unpublished) hereinafter cited from People v. Ferber, No. 240
(N.Y. Ct. App. May 13, 1981) (slip opinion).
130. Id. at 3 (slip op.).
131. Id. at 4 (slip op.).
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CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
The statute at issue in this case would go further, if as the Dis-
trict Attorney urges it is designed to protect children employed
in the making of plays, films and books. With respect to re-
corded performances or photographs the statute draws no dis-
tinction between those made in this state and those made
elsewhere. Anyone who promotes such materials would be
subject to prosecution even though the act recorded may have
occurred in another state or country where such conduct may
not be prohibited. It applies equally to a live performance of a
Broadway play and a filmed report of New Guinea fertility
rites. Indeed in this case defendant's conviction did not rest on
any contention that the film was made in this state. To the ex-
tent the statute would purport to regulate the sexual perform-
ances of children throughout the world there is some question
as to whether that goal, however commendable, necessarily
comes within the police powers of the State of New York."3 2
The court thus seems to suggest that section 263.15 may be
unconstitutional, either because it reaches protected expres-
sion, or because it goes beyond the state's police power. But
the court's actual holding is based on narrower grounds. "As-
suming, without deciding," that the state "may prohibit the...
promotion of ... visual materials, whenever the making of the
film necessarily involved a violation of some other law
designed to protect the performers, at least youthful perform-
ers, from a danger to their health and well-being,"' 3 3 the court
held section 263.15 to be "strikingly underinclusive." The stat-
ute addresses only sexually oriented material, and
does not prohibit the knowing sale or promotion of any fim, or
other item, in which a child has performed a dangerous stunt
or where production required a child to engage in any of the
numerous activities which the Legislature in the exercise of its
police power has determined is [sic] dangerous to the health
or well-being of child employees or employees generally. ...
In short, the statute discriminates against films and other vis-
ual portrayals of non-obscene adolescent sex solely on the ba-
sis of their content, and since no justification has been shown
for the distinction other than special legislative distaste for this
type of portrayal, the statute cannot be sustained (Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, supra at 215).134
132. Id. at 4-5 (slip op.).
133. Id. at 5 (slip op.).





The narrow holding in Ferber is not entirely persuasive. It
rests heavily on the assertion that the "statute discriminates
... solely on the basis of. . . content," an assertion the dissent
forcefully called into question.135  It seems doubtful that sec-
tion 263.15 is "underinclusive" within the meaning of Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville .136 But it is clear from the body of the
decision that the real issue in Ferber is not one of underinclu-
siveness. Clearly the court believed that First Amendment val-
ues outweighed any good that section 263.15 might accomplish.
Apparently the court thought it wise to decide the case on nar-
rower grounds.
It has repeatedly been urged that the state's interest in child
pornography legislation is solely that of protecting children
from direct abuse in pornography. The most striking lesson of
New York's experience is that this is a bad fiction. Child por-
nography legislation is also directed against obscenity,'37 has
been used against obscenity, 38 and should be used against ob-
scenity; this is an important part of its function.
139
The real question is whether an obscenity standard would
unduly burden prosecutors in child pornography cases. On the
basis of exhaustive testimony, two congressional committees
concluded that it would not unduly burden prosecutors; that
juries would not tolerate films or pictures depicting child
abuse, and that in practice almost all child pornography is
135. Id. at 5, 9 (slip op.) (dissent). The dissent argued that teenage sexuality could
be discussed--or presumably, depicted-without using juvenile actors.
136. 442 U.S. 205 (1975). Erznoznik is readily distinguishable. In Erznoznik, the
Supreme Court overturned an ordinance making it a public nuisance for a drive-in
theater to show films depicting nudity, if the screen was visible from a street or other
public area. It was argued inter alia that such a display might create a traffic hazard.
The Court held that the ordinance was "strikingly underinclusive" because any
spectacular film might have a similar effect, id. at 214-15. The issue of traffic safety was
raised only in oral argument and was easily disposed of. The Court saw "no justifica-
tion.., for distinguishing movies containing nudity from all other movies in a regula-
tion designed to protect traffic." Id. at 214-15. Child pornography legislation protects a
more important state interest. Child pornography is notoriously a social.problem in
need of a remedy; the question is only how drastic the remedy must be. It has not
been maintained that the depiction of children engaged in a "dangerous stunt" consti-
tutes a serious problem, and it would be surprising if the legislature had mentioned it
in the statute.
137. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text, supra.
138. See notes 115-117 and accompanying text, supra.




Super-obscenity laws are mischievous, and they rest on
questionable assumptions. Super-obscenity laws are not
needed. They should be declared unconstitutional.
140. See notes 50-59 and accompanying text, supra.
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